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Abstract
Between 1999 and 2001 about 4,800 Iraqi refugees made 
their way to Australia. While the vast majority reached 
their destination, some never got that far, instead fi nding 
themselves stranded in Indonesia for up to 10 years. Th e 
author conducted interviews with Iraqi refugees in both 
Indonesia and Australia, from which a number of themes 
emerged. Central to these was the insecurity and uncer-
tainty faced by participants over a protracted period with 
a marked diff erence when comparing the narratives of the 
participants settled in Australia with those living in a limbo 
situation in Indonesia. Th e former recalled the stresses of 
their journey and the associated feelings of fear, anxiety, 
and depression. In the case of the latter group, these feel-
ings were ever present as their journey was not yet over.
Résumé
C’est au nombre de 4800 que des réfugiés irakiens se sont 
installés en Australie entre 1999 et 2001. Alors que la 
majorité de ce nombre ont atteint leur destination, cer-
tains ne se sont jamais rendus et se sont retrouvés bloqués 
en Indonésie pendant une période allant jusqu’à 10 ans. 
L’auteur a eff ectué des entrevues avec des réfugiés ira-
kiens en Indonésie et en Australie, et un certain nombre 
de thèmes se sont dégagés. Un des thèmes centraux est 
l’insécurité et l’incertitude des réfugiés confrontés à un 
séjour prolongé, ainsi que le contraste marqué entre les 
récits des réfugiés installés en Australie, et de ceux coincés 
en Indonésie. Alors que les réfugiés installés en Australie 
avaient enfi n la possibilité de digérer le stress du voyage et 
les sentiments associés de peur, d’anxiété et de dépression, 
ces derniers, bloqués en Indonésie subissaient ces mêmes 
sentiments quotidiennement comme si leur voyage n’était 
pas encore terminé.
Introduction
Between 1999 and 2001 an estimated 4,800 Iraqis transited 
Indonesia, leaving on smugglers’ boats bound for Australia. 
However a few hundred did not make that fi nal leg of their 
journey and found themselves living in a limbo-like situa-
tion for up to 10 years in Indonesia. Initially incarcerated 
in Indonesian immigration detention centres, they were 
later released to live in the community. However, without 
work rights, their day-to day-living arrangements were 
dependent upon agreements made between the Indonesian 
government, the Australian government, United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM), rendering 
the Iraqis largely powerless in making even the most basic 
decisions about their lives and futures.
In 2006 and 2007, as part of my doctoral research 
which examined the journeys of Iraqi refugees from the 
Middle East to Australia, I interviewed Iraqi refugees in 
both Australia and Indonesia.1 Th e absence of research 
focused on refugee journeys from the Middle East across 
southeast Asia was an important consideration in decid-
ing to use interview and analysis methods infl uenced by 
grounded theory. Grounded theory contrasts with other 
research methods which typically require the researcher 
to decide upon the main focus of the study and review the 
literature before gathering and analyzing data. Th is can be 
problematic when the study concerns a social phenomenon 
for which there is minimal literature available. Adopting a 
grounded theory approach means the central theme of the 
research is decided upon aft er conducting initial interviews 
during which the participants identify what they regard as 
important and signifi cant. Analysis of early interviews then 
infl uences decisions by the researcher about the selection of 
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further participants, the subjects canvassed in later inter-
views, and the overall direction of the research.2
For these reasons, grounded theory is particularly well-
suited to studies such as mine where there has been little 
previous research or literature to draw on. Consistent with 
a grounded theory approach, rather than preparing detailed 
questions for participants to answer, I invited study partici-
pants to tell the story of their journey from Iraq in what-
ever way they chose. As well as providing them with the 
opportunity to talk about what they regarded as important 
and signifi cant, it was consistent with a major aim of my 
research which was to centre the refugee voice.
I drew upon two main bodies of sociological theory con-
cerned with risk to interpret and analyze the circumstances 
of participants. Ulrich Beck presents a view of the modern 
world that “is increasingly occupied with debating, pre-
venting and managing risks that it itself has produced.”3 Beck 
argues that decisions made in one era can have unexpected 
consequences for future generations which are unbounded 
by time or national borders, and that such hazards typically 
have the most devastating impact upon the poor and vul-
nerable who are least able to insure or protect themselves 
against risk. Obvious parallels can be drawn between Beck’s 
theory and the refugee issue, where confl icts and regimes 
that give rise to refugees have their origins in decisions 
made in previous decades. Th is is particularly apposite 
with regard to Iraqis. Aft er the First World War and the 
break-up of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations 
gave the British the mandate over Mesopotamia, which was 
renamed Iraq aft er some adjustments to borders to suit col-
onial interests. Although the mandate formally ended in 
1932, many Iraqis considered British involvement in their 
aff airs to have fi nished only when the British-installed mon-
archy was overthrown in 1958, which was coincidentally the 
year Saddam Hussein joined the Ba’ath party.4
Beck drew attention to the distinction between “risk 
decision makers and those who have to deal with the con-
sequences of decisions of others.”5 He also made reference 
to the power imbalance between them; powerful actors 
minimize the risk to themselves while increasing the risk 
to others. Th e power diff erential is readily apparent when 
considering the situation for refugees who fl ee their country 
of origin when their own government is unwilling or unable 
to aff ord them safety and security. Th ey are then obliged 
to prevail upon other countries from a position of no or 
limited legal rights and hence vulnerability. In this case the 
balance of power is clearly weighted in favour of national 
governments who have the sovereign power to grant or deny 
them refuge.
From a diff erent perspective, risk is regarded as a tech-
nology by which social problems can be managed. Th is 
approach has its origins in the work of Michel Foucault and 
the governmentality theorists who developed his ideas.6 
Foucault distinguished between three modes of exercis-
ing authority; sovereignty, discipline, and governmental-
ity. Sovereign power is evident through the exercise of law 
and military deployment; discipline is the means by which 
institutions such as prisons, factories, and schools exert 
power over inmates, workers, and pupils to conform and 
is achieved through self regulation; and governmentality is 
concerned with the various mechanisms employed to exer-
cise authority and control populations that extend beyond 
security forces, laws, and institutions. It relates to the strat-
egies and tactics used to shape and infl uence the attitudes, 
beliefs, and behaviours of resident populations.7
Th e state is therefore but one element in a complex array 
of authorities, organizations and institutions through 
which power is dispersed. Th ese are Foucault’s “apparatuses 
of security,” the means by which the trilogy of sovereignty, 
discipline, and governmentality shape conduct.8 Th ey 
include the military and police forces, intelligence agencies, 
and the health, welfare, and social systems.9
Governmentality theorists suggest that governing is the 
more or less deliberate attempt to direct behaviour of indi-
viduals targeted by a particular policy to bring about a par-
ticular result. Examples include public campaigns that warn 
of the risks associated with drink-driving or political rhet-
oric concerning the dangers inherent in boarding unsafe 
smugglers’ boats, especially if travelling with children. 
Importantly, this shaping of conduct is moral in nature 
whereby government purports to know what behaviour is 
good and desirable and what behaviour is deviant.10
My research also considered the psychological impact of 
living under duress for extended periods of time, and how 
people overcome such experiences. Th ese matters are briefl y 
addressed in this article.
Participants’ reasons for leaving Iraq, and the timing of 
their departures, varied. Some had fl ed or been forced out 
of Iraq by the ruling regime up to 20 years earlier, suspected 
of having Iranian antecedents at the time of the eight-year 
war between Iraq and Iran which started in 1980. Others 
had left  Iraq in the aft ermath of the 1991 uprisings in Iraq’s 
south and the Kurdish north. Th e uprisings were brutally 
crushed by Saddam Hussein’s regime which then sought 
retribution against its opponents. Some fl ed Iraq during the 
late 1990s aft er becoming of interest to Iraqi intelligence 
because of the actions of a father or brother or cousin; or 
because they refused to spy on colleagues or inform upon 
neighbours.
Th e countries of fi rst asylum for participants were Iran, 
Jordan, or Syria. Of those who went to Iran, some made 
a decent life for themselves while others remained on the 
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margins of society. In the late 1990s, Iranian authorities, 
struggling to cope with almost two million Afghan and 
Iraqi refugees, announced that it was time for people to go 
and started to withdraw work and other rights to reinforce 
that message.11
Neither Jordan nor Syria provided the safety or stability 
sought by the Iraqis. Even if they arrived legally, they lost 
that status as visas expired. Th ey did not have work rights 
and struggled to survive. Jordan in particular was regarded 
as a place where onward travel was organized rather than 
off ering a permanent home.12
As to why participants targeted Australia, in my study 
only a small number had friends or relatives living there. 
Th e majority followed the advice of smugglers; were infl u-
enced by cost when compared with journeys to Europe; or 
believed that as a Western country, Australia supported 
human rights and would provide sanctuary. Th e route to 
Australia for almost all involved a short sojourn in Malaysia, 
then to Indonesia with the intention of taking a boat to 
Australia.
Indonesia as Host
Indonesia is made up of over 17,000 islands of which 6,000 
are inhabited. It is home to 240 million people and is the most 
populous Muslim nation. As well as contending with wide-
spread poverty, corruption, and poor infrastructure across 
the islands, Indonesian authorities have had to address 
calls for independence from the populations of Papua, East 
Timor, and Aceh which have seen bloody confrontations 
between local militia and the powerful Indonesian mil-
itary.13 Th e relationship between Indonesia and its closest 
southern neighbour, Australia, has been variable, with per-
iods of cooperation interrupted by chilling of diplomatic 
relations, most noticeably with regard to Australia’s support 
of East Timor at the time of its independence.14
Between 1979 and 1996, Indonesia had hosted refugee 
camps on the island of Galang for Indochinese refugees 
awaiting resettlement. When these closed there were very 
few refugees in the country. By the end of 1997, there were 
an estimated 100 refugees, mainly from the Middle East 
region.15 Yet between 1999 and 2001 about 13,000 refugees 
tried to reach Australia from Indonesia, of whom about 
4,800 were Iraqi. Th is increase in refugee numbers had little 
to do with internal Indonesian politics, being instead a con-
sequence of “push” factors in the Middle East region and 
growth in people-smuggling activity in Indonesia. Th ere 
is no data to suggest that the relatively small numbers of 
refugees, most of whom transited Indonesia en route to 
Australia, were considered to be a risk factor for Indonesia 
given the size of its base population and the other priorities 
it had to address. Indonesia is not a signatory to the UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugees 
Convention), and at the time had not legislated to protect 
refugees.16
However, the presence of growing numbers of refugees in 
Indonesia was of concern to Australia, which had long dem-
onstrated a reluctance to accept people arriving by boat on 
Australian shores asking for protection. Rather than being 
characterized as a humanitarian problem it was framed in 
terms of a risk to national and border security. In 2001, the 
Liberal Party—which was part of the Coalition government 
then in power—claimed that:17
Th e illegal movement of people poses a serious security and law 
enforcement challenge for Australia. People smuggling provides 
opportunities for the extension of international criminal activity, 
for the spread of terrorism, for the breakdown of law and order, 
and for the violation of laws which protect Australian health and 
security.
Fuelled by such rhetoric, public opinion in Australia 
was generally hostile to unauthorized boat arrivals. Th e 
Australian government instigated a number of measures 
to stop refugees reaching Australia by boat including a 
Regional Cooperation Agreement with the Indonesian gov-
ernment. Th is encouraged detention of asylum seekers by 
Indonesian authorities, aided by Australia’s willingness to 
fund Indonesian detention facilities.18 Despite a change in 
government in Australia in 2007 and soft ening of the rhet-
oric, similar policies have continued as not to do so is polit-
ically risky for whichever government is in power, given the 
widespread antipathy to refugees and asylum seekers.
IOM, established in 1951, is an intergovernmental 
agency with over 120 member states. From December 1999 
Australia contracted IOM to provide a range of migration-
related services in Indonesia and other overseas locations, 
as part of its policy to prevent asylum seekers making their 
way to Australia. IOM in Indonesia has been involved in 
the monitoring and surveillance of those suspected of 
planning to travel to Australia to seek asylum as well as 
providing them with medical services, food and shelter, 
and assistance to return to their country of origin.19 Th is 
exemplifi es how a sovereign power such as Australia util-
izes external agencies to shape and infl uence the conduct of 
the objects of policy.
Th e Iraqi refugees in Indonesia were considered to be 
illegal immigrants if they did not have appropriate papers. 
If caught they were detained by Indonesian authorities 
and theoretically faced deportation. However, according 
to one commentator Indonesia did not have the funds to 
fi nance deportations, with the result that refugees stayed in 
detention.20
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Generally, it was only intervention by UNHCR and sub-
sequent registration with them that secured their release. 
As UNHCR resources were limited, refugees could be held 
for weeks in substandard accommodation before they were 
interviewed. When refugee claims were denied, applicants 
remained in detention indefi nitely.21
An exception to this was made for hundreds of Middle 
Easterners, including Iraqis, who had been held in 
Indonesian immigration facilities for a number of years 
in the early 2000s. According to those interviewed by the 
author, without any explanation being proff ered, between 
2005 and 2007 they were moved to villas and hotels organ-
ized and overseen by IOM. Like those formally recognized 
as refugees by UNHCR in Jakarta they had no legal status 
in Indonesia and were not permitted to work. With few 
exceptions, their children were not able to attend schools.22 
Refugees recognized as such by UNHCR were given a small 
allowance by UNHCR whereas others living in the com-
munity received an allowance from IOM.
In addition to the refugees who interacted with UNHCR 
and/or IOM, many others transited Indonesia without mak-
ing contact with these agencies. Either they were kept hid-
den by their smugglers and had no such opportunity, or 
they were not interested in approaching UNHCR, having 
little faith in its ability to assist them as UNHCR-registered 
refugees stayed in Indonesia for years.23
Participant Interviews and Accounts
In late 2006 I interviewed Iraqi refugees who had been set-
tled in Australia for a few years by that time. In early 2007 
in Indonesia I interviewed Iraqis who had been living there 
in a limbo situation since before 2003; their numbers were 
being slowly augmented by new arrivals fl eeing the Middle 
East region.
Th e fi eldwork component was undertaken in the Cisarua/
Puncak area of Indonesia, about 100 kilometres south of the 
Indonesian capital of Jakarta. Although a popular tourist 
destination for wealthy Indonesians away from the stifl ing 
heat of the capital, it attracts few Western visitors. Th e refu-
gees I met there were in a range of accommodation, with the 
majority living in small chalet-like homes in one of two com-
pounds. One compound housed mainly Sabean Mandeans 
and the other was home mainly to Shia Muslims but also 
housed other nationalities such as Burmese. A number of 
men who had travelled alone—either single men or not 
accompanied by their families—lived in a nearby hotel.
In addition to conducting eight interviews, I met with a 
group of six men aged between 30 and 55 years, and spent 
many hours with participants and other Iraqis in social 
settings which were opportunities to gain further insights 
complementing the formal interviews. In all I spoke at 
length with about 30 Iraqis in Indonesia. When referring 
to or quoting participants below, pseudonyms have been 
used and I have avoided specifying medical conditions and 
naming professions that could lead to a participant being 
identifi ed.
Of the eight interviews, four were conducted in people’s 
homes, one in a café, two in communal gardens, and one 
in a television room used by the 40 or so residents living in 
the same complex. Five interviews required an interpreter. 
Without a working knowledge of Arabic, it was not possible 
for me to be sure of the quality of translation. However the 
responses as interpreted made sense given the questions I 
had asked, and at no time did the interpreter and partici-
pant appear to be engaging in a private conversation.
Generally, the Iraqis treated me hospitably, off ering 
refreshments. Th e one occasion where I encountered direct 
hostility occurred when I met with the group of six men. 
Th e atmosphere was tense as they questioned me about what 
I was doing and why. Th ey told me about another researcher 
who had disclosed information which created problems for 
them. It was evident that conducting interviews with these 
men was not appropriate but they did have opinions and 
views they wanted to convey, and they gave me permission 
to use these. Th is experience highlighted one of the many 
ethical challenges that can arise when conducting social 
research with marginalized and vulnerable groups.24
Six Years and Counting …
Participants interviewed in Indonesia recounted why 
they, unlike the vast majority of Iraqis who had transited 
Malaysia and Indonesia en route to Australia, were still 
there. For some, their plans to reach Australia had been 
thwarted when they were caught by Indonesian authorities 
and imprisoned. A few ran out of money to pay smugglers 
or were unable to get a passage on a smugglers’ boat before 
the trade all but fi nished in late 2001. Others preferred to 
register with UNHCR in the hope of being resettled. Some 
changed their minds about travelling on smugglers’ boats to 
Australia aft er bad experiences on such boats. Taeseer was 
one, and recounted what happened to him and his family.
Th e boat journey was like death for twenty-four hours. Th ere were 
twenty-one people on the boat which was a very small fi shing boat 
and not big enough for twenty-one people. Th ey put us on the bot-
tom of boat. We lay down and they covered us with piece of wood 
maybe thirty centimetres from the ground. Th en they put goods 
on top of that. We could not move. Nothing to eat, our little girl 
took milk. We sacrifi ced ourselves, all that trouble just for the 
future. Th e boat journey was in October when it was rainy and 
stormy. Th e smuggler chose bad weather as police don’t patrol in 
bad weather and so wouldn’t fi nd us.
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Norres was one of a group of 23 Mandeans who, in 
October 2001, boarded a boat to Australia which came to 
be known as SIEV X. Alarmed by the overcrowding and the 
condition of the boat, the group disembarked while the boat 
was still close to the Indonesian shoreline. Th e following 
day SIEV X sank en route to Australia, killing 353 people, 
mainly Iraqi women and children.25 In Norres’s words:
Th e waves were high. Th e boat began to break up, and water 
started to come in … I was unconscious. I was sitting on the 
fl oor and behind me a piece of wood came loose. I was scared and 
thought I would fall into the sea. We smelt smoke and the bad 
smell of burning. It seemed as though we wouldn’t arrive safely. 
We saw a fi shing boat and called to them, and the twenty-three 
Mandeans left  the boat.
Th e boat we had been on had sunk but we didn’t know. We heard 
that the police captured it, then we heard that it sank, then we 
heard it arrived. We didn’t know. We decided to try again to go 
to Australia. Th en aft er two to three days we heard the news that 
the boat had defi nitely sank with very few survivors, maybe forty 
to forty fi ve. Once we heard the news, we didn’t want to try again.
Fear and Insecurity; Anxiety and Powerlessness
For all participants, whether interviewed in Indonesia or 
Australia, fear was a constant at all stages in their journey. It 
varied in intensity but was never absent. Some participants, 
especially the women, were reluctant to venture outside in 
Indonesia as their appearance and dress made them highly 
visible. Nezal was particularly frightened. “In Jakarta, we 
stayed in the hotel room for ten days. We were scared and 
worried in Indonesia.” Nazek harboured similar fears. “We 
were afraid and in hiding, just waiting for the people smug-
gler to tell us what to do. We were like sheep. If told to go—
we go. If told to stay—we stay.”
A number of participants spoke of their fear of being 
incarcerated, having experienced prison in Iraq or seen 
the eff ect of Iraqi prisons on relatives. Th is fear was real-
ized. All the participants based in Indonesia were locked 
up in Indonesian immigration detention facilities, of which 
there are a number across Indonesia of varying standards. 
Kokeb said that he and his family were arrested at their 
hotel on the day they arrived in Mendan, Indonesia, and 
spent 11 months in immigration detention, far away from 
UNHCR and IOM, which made it diffi  cult to follow up on 
their cases. He said that although they were treated satisfac-
torily, the facility was unhygienic and many people became 
sick. Anness described a diff erent facility in Jakarta which 
housed two to three hundred people where the conditions 
were very bad, with four or fi ve persons or a single family 
to a room which was constantly checked. Th ey were given 
little food and kept isolated.
No reason was given as to why Iraqi and other refugees 
in Indonesia were relocated from immigration detention 
centres aft er 2005 to better accommodation with greater 
freedom of movement and association. Anness doubted that 
concern for their welfare accounted for the change, believ-
ing instead it was simply to reduce pressure on the various 
authorities to fi nd a permanent solution for them. It has not 
been possible to fi nd any offi  cial explanation or reference to 
the changes.26
Despite these improved living conditions, participants 
still felt unsafe. Having been moved from detention centre 
to detention centre, and then into the community, with no 
explanation, they did not know for sure if they would be 
allowed to remain in Indonesia, under what conditions and 
what might happen next. Th e decisions aff ecting their long-
term future were in the hands of UNCHR and the Australian 
and Indonesian governments. Control of their daily lives 
rested with these bodies and IOM. Th ese contributed to their 
general sense of powerlessness over their lives.
In this regard, there was a sharp contrast with the 
accounts of the Iraqi refugees settled in Australia. At the 
time of their interviews, they had lived in Australia for 
fi ve or so years, with the worst of their experiences behind 
them. While both groups spoke of the chronic fear they 
experienced during their journeys, those in Australia were 
recalling past events from which they had moved on; the 
Indonesia-based participants continued to live with the fear 
on a daily basis as their situation remained unresolved.
Indeed, it was clear that the issues of greatest signifi cance 
to the Indonesia-based participants were their ongoing 
uncertainty and the years they felt had been wasted in 
Indonesia. Th ey spoke of being pressured in the past by IOM 
to leave Indonesia and return to Iraq, and of being off ered 
fi nancial inducements to do so, but by 2007 this practice 
had largely stopped. For this reason, by the time I met them, 
they were not so concerned that they would be returned to 
Iraq against their will. However they spoke about ongoing 
anxiety and an inability to relax. Th ey worried about family 
left  behind, they worried about what the future might hold, 
they worried about how they would survive fi nancially day 
to day, and they worried about the decisions they had made 
that had got them to where they were.
Wasted Years
Even though participants at the time of interviews were liv-
ing in the community and could travel freely in the local 
area, they had to obtain permission to travel further afi eld 
and were not permitted to work. Th e denial of work rights 
aff ected participants on many levels. With support from 
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UNHCR and IOM they received enough money to buy the 
basics but little else. Although their accommodation was 
secure, they lived in poverty. Th e lack of work rights was 
particularly distressing to participants who had the skills 
and desire to work. Th e professionals amongst them felt this 
keenly. Anness grieved for what his life could have been. 
Aft er describing the obstacles he overcame to become quali-
fi ed in his chosen profession and how hard he had studied, 
he said how wrong it was to deprive a person of the oppor-
tunity to put their skills to use.
Kokeb recounted how they passed their time. “We sit 
around. Th ere is nothing to do. Sometimes we exercise, 
play games, use the computer or read books. We kill time 
as life continues.” Th e standard of their accommodation 
and its location in a picturesque region of Indonesia was 
not enough to ameliorate the feelings of being trapped and 
powerless. As Gadeer said, “A bird in a beautiful cage is still 
in a cage.”
Participants with families carried the burden of see-
ing their children suff er. Kokeb expressed his concern 
that children especially had been harmed by being held in 
Indonesian jails and detention centres. Like other parents, 
he was also worried of the lifelong impact on his children 
of missing out on the educational and social benefi ts of 
attending school. He had two children, both of whom had 
reached school age when they left  the Middle East. Aft er 
six years in Indonesia, he was anxious about their psych-
ological health, particularly that of his daughter, who had 
few opportunities to socialize. He blamed himself, believing 
he had made mistakes in bringing his family to Indonesia 
where they faced a hopeless future, with his children paying 
for his mistakes.
Participants resettled in Australia recalled their experi-
ences of Australian immigration detention centres and, 
upon release, of being issued with Temporary Protection 
Visa (TPVs) rather than their permanent equivalents. TPVs 
were introduced in late October 1999 for those recognized as 
refugees who had arrived in Australia without pre-arranged 
visas. TPV holders did not know if they would be allowed to 
remain in Australia. Th ey could work but were not able to 
access facilities available to other refugees in Australia such 
as English classes and government assistance with fi nding 
employment. Th e harshest restrictions attached to TPVs 
related to family reunion and travel rights. Other refugees 
with permanent protection could apply for family members 
to join them, and were permitted to travel overseas and 
return to Australia. Th ese rights were denied to TPV hold-
ers with the result that they were unable to be reunited with 
family, either in Australia or overseas, without losing the 
right to live in Australia.27
Participants in my study and other research28 spoke of 
the adverse eff ect that living with TPVs had on their psycho-
logical health. However their situation was arguably better 
than the refugees in Indonesia. TPV holders at least had 
work rights and were therefore able to occupy their time; 
plus they had more autonomy in managing their lives com-
pared with those in limbo in Indonesia.
Disillusionment with UNHCR and IOM
Six of the eight participants interviewed in Indonesia 
expressed negative views towards UNHCR and IOM. Th e 
slow and opaque processing of asylum applications left  par-
ticipants perplexed and distressed by the diff erent outcomes 
when all had fl ed Iraq and the Saddam regime. Taeseer said 
that his application for refugee status was rejected aft er his 
fi rst interview and he was not told why. He said that he was 
still waiting for a response to an appeal he lodged before 
learning that the processing of Iraqi cases was put on hold 
in 2003 aft er the US invasion. Norres gave a similar account.
UNHCR interviewed us in February 2002. Th ey reject us in April 
2002. It never  occurred to us that UNHCR would reject us. We 
were interviewed again in May 2002. Th ere is still no result from 
that interview. In April 2006, they asked us to attend a new inter-
view, so now we are waiting for the results from that interview.
Th ose found to be refugees were frustrated by UNHCR’s 
failure to resettle them. “People are stuck in Indonesia. We 
are afraid to go back and cannot go forward. We are stuck 
in the middle,” said Sabah. Th is was alarming for new arriv-
als. “When the new arrivals see the people who’d been in 
Indonesia for four years, they have no hope,” he added. 
Anness recalled that when he, with others, demonstrated in 
front of UNHCR and IOM offi  ces, the police were called 
to intervene and prevent journalists from talking with the 
refugees. Hadeel said he was eff ectively blackmailed by 
UNHCR staff  who told him not to demonstrate or go on a 
hunger strike because if he did, Australia wouldn’t help him, 
and that it would be better if the refugees accepted that life 
was unfair.
Th eir disillusionment with UNHCR went further than 
the body’s inability to arrange settlement in a third country 
or work rights in Indonesia. Gadeer questioned its priorities.
Th e UNHCR offi  ce in Jakarta grows and improves. We think they 
are funded by Australia. UNHCR is supposed to be humanitar-
ian but we see them to be a political organisation, in which case 
they are working for others and not helping asylum seekers fi nd 
a solution.
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He, like many others, also suspected the politicization of 
UNHCR and IOM because they encouraged refugees to 
return to Iraq even though many Iraqi cities were unsafe.
As for resettlement in another country, this was unlikely 
as countries with resettlement programs were reluctant to 
take refugees they saw as Australia’s responsibility, given 
that they had been intercepted en route to Australia, were 
physically close to Australia, and Australia funded both 
UNHCR and IOM in Indonesia.29 Th is caused additional 
frustration and despair. Hadeel said that he asked UNHCR 
to refer his case to Denmark where his sister and cousins 
lived but aft er a year was told that his only option was 
Australia although much later he was informed that his case 
would be put to Denmark. He said that even UNHCR staff  
regarded their situation as hopeless, telling the refugees 
they would be better off  going with smugglers operating in 
Indonesia.
Participants had even greater misgivings about IOM 
than the UNCHR, feeling that the organization monitored 
their lives and restricted their freedom. Anness claimed 
that IOM watched them and reported upon them. He said 
that until 2004, IOM prevented them having contact with 
the outside world but their situation has since changed and 
the refugees can speak freely with journalists, researchers, 
and social workers.
Resilience and Coping
Time and again it became clear the participants attempted 
to ameliorate their situation in Indonesia. When they were 
moved to better accommodation, but provided with only 
mattress, blanket, and pillow, they acquired chairs, tables, 
and beds over the years. Th ey attempted to set up classes 
and share their skills. Th ey held demonstrations outside 
UNHCR offi  ces and tried, without much success, to arrange 
regular meetings with it. Further, over time the diff erent 
religious groups organized places where they could gather; 
the Shia now had a mosque, and the Mandeans had their 
own place.
Some of the men had married Indonesian women and 
had children. Th is, however, was tainted with great sadness, 
so much so I could not bring myself to explore it further 
with participants. As Anness told me ,“Many of the men 
have Indonesian wives now. Some men have left  wives and 
kids at home. When families are split up, it’s really painful 
to be separated for such a long time.”
Anness spoke about how the refugees were supportive of 
each other. If they had problems between them, they resolved 
it themselves and avoided involving IOM in their disputes. 
He refl ected that in the cramped detention environments 
where many people lived in one room for years, arguments 
inevitably occurred. Th ese tended to be over food and access 
to the few toilets. He refl ected that in the beginning, hopes 
of reaching Australia dominated people’s thoughts. But as 
these hopes faded, they turned to making the best of their 
situation, recognizing that thinking about Australia all the 
time did them no good.
At various times, participants singly or in groups organ-
ized classes to pass on their skills. Taeseer said that between 
them, they had computer skills, English language and Arab 
literature. He said that they taught each other although the 
informal classes were mainly for the children. However, 
while sharing a meal with Anness and his family, I was 
told that, for a combination of reasons, the initiatives taken 
amongst the Iraqis to educate the children were not able to 
be sustained. Although they had knowledge of various sub-
jects, they did not have material aids like books and black-
boards, or venues to provide schooling to groups of children. 
In addition, both adults and children were worn out and 
depressed by their circumstances and attempts to school 
the children in any regular fashion faltered.
Th e Ingredients of Feeling Safe
It is well established that recovery from past trauma such as 
that typically experienced by people from a refugee back-
ground can only begin when people feel safe.30 Specifi cally, 
Steel et al.31 argue that a “sense of security … seems to 
be essential for refugees to recover from trauma-related 
psychiatric symptoms” and that “insecure residency and 
associated fears of repatriation contribute to the persistence 
of psychiatric symptoms and associated disabilities.”
One of the characteristics of the refugee experience is 
being caught up in events that are beyond the capacity of 
the individual to control. Th is may create a sense of power-
lessness and shatter a person’s belief in their ability to man-
age their own lives. It points to the importance of building 
self-effi  cacy and self-empowerment as part of the recovery 
process in the aft ermath of experiencing extreme events.32 
Family also plays a crucial role in the recovery process. 
While a person is worrying about their family, they are less 
likely to have the internal resources to tend to their own 
needs. Conversely recovery is impeded if there are fears 
about the well-being of family members. A recent study 
conducted with Iraqi refugees settled in Australia found 
that their concerns for the safety of family still in Iraq had 
a signifi cant impact on the severity of post-traumatic stress 
disorder, anxiety, and depression.33
Employment is another critical element in regaining 
hope for their future.34 Practically, it means an income 
which can pay for accommodation and buy possessions. It 
also provides routine and stability, and builds a sense of 
competence and self-worth. It allows a person the satisfac-
tion of knowing they are providing for self and family. It 
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also connects people to their community and can be the 
base for new social networks. It occupies the mind, provid-
ing a positive distraction from memories of events of the 
past.35 In this fashion, employment contributes to a feel-
ing of being safe and secure, necessary for the healing from 
trauma to occur.
Hobfoll et al.36 make the point that unless people who 
have been through extreme adversity feel safe, have the 
means to start rebuilding their lives, and are able to estab-
lish control over their daily lives, psychological interven-
tions have little benefi t. Almedom and Summerfi eld37 sum 
up the situation perfectly:
How people recover from catastrophe is a profound question, 
but the lessons of history are straightforward: “recovery” is not 
a discrete process. It happens in people’s lives rather than their 
psychologies. It is practical and unspectacular, grounded in the 
resumption of the ordinary rhythms of everyday life—familial, 
sociocultural, religious and economic activities that make the 
world intelligible.
Th e Situation of Participants
Rather than being given the tools to build self-effi  cacy 
and self-reliance, participants based in Indonesia had few 
opportunities to exert control over their own lives. Th ey had 
all spent years detained in immigration detention facilities 
before being moved to hotels or villas. Th e small allow-
ance they were given to buy food was barely adequate but 
they were not allowed to work to augment it. If they needed 
medical attention they were reliant on IOM. Th e inability 
to provide adequately for themselves and their families was 
particularly hard for the men, traditionally the providers. 
Without money or a job, each day was the same, with no 
hope for improvement or change. Th e lack of work rights 
was a major contributor to boredom and depression. Many 
participants felt that fruitful years of their lives were sim-
ply going to waste. Th ose with professional training feared 
losing the skills they had acquired along with any hope 
of resurrecting their careers. Single men were concerned 
they were missing the opportunity to fi nd wives and start 
families. Th ose who had left  their families behind in the 
Middle East had no means to support them from afar or 
be reunited, while those who had travelled with their fam-
ilies saw their children becoming depressed and shamed 
because of the lack of schooling and opportunity. Th is left  
the men troubled by guilt, feeling it was their decisions that 
had placed their families in this situation.
Further, participants had no idea how long they would 
be in that situation, and indeed, if it would ever improve. 
Th ose who had been unsuccessful with their applications 
to UNHCR for refugee status and resettlement would 
reapply. Steel et al.38 point out that refugee claimants can be 
retraumatized by retelling their story, especially in a formal 
setting and under questioning where any challenge to their 
credibility can have a deleterious eff ect on mental health.
Th e normal and natural response for people facing stress-
ful conditions is to use their own resources and abilities to 
try and improve their situation.39 Generally, the partici-
pants warehoused in Indonesia did this. However they were 
faced with socio-political realities that left  them feeling 
vulnerable and insecure. Th e solution to their stress and 
anxiety lay in the simple expedient of allowing them to 
live without the fear of physical harm, a permanent home, 
family reunion, work rights, and education for their chil-
dren but for many years this was denied them.
Concluding Th oughts
Participants in both Indonesia and Australia voiced simi-
lar sentiments concerning their years of uncertainty and 
insecurity and the adverse eff ect these had on their psych-
ological well-being. Th eir narratives clearly indicate that 
refugee populations through no fault of their own fi nd 
themselves to be largely powerless and at the mercy of those 
in positions of power. Th e Australian government, with its 
access to extensive resources, sought to minimize its pol-
itical risk by using a variety of means to stop asylum seek-
ers reaching Australian shores and deterring others from 
attempting that journey even though these means increased 
the risk to the asylum seekers in the following ways. Th eir 
physical and mental health was put at risk because of years 
of incarceration, uncertainty, living in poverty, and, for 
many, separation from families left  behind. With almost no 
legitimate means of fi nding permanent refuge, many refu-
gees bought passages on smugglers’ boats and some of those 
lost their lives in the seas between Indonesia and Australia. 
IOM, at the behest of the Australian government, encour-
aged Iraqis to return to home despite the uncertain secur-
ity situation there. Th e Australian government painted the 
asylum seekers as deviant to justify policy responses40 and 
to varying degrees suborned other bodies such as UNHCR, 
IOM, and the Indonesian government to its own interests. 
Th ese bodies then operated, using Foucault’s nomenclature, 
as apparatuses of security for the Australian government.
Pat O’Malley,41 who has written extensively on risk, 
argued that although the technology of risk is generally 
regarded negatively by liberal scholars and proponents of 
social justice, the adoption of a risk analytic to address a 
social problem could be productive. He suggested that such 
an approach allows framing an issue diff erently, involving 
the objects of policy in the development of it, and de-empha-
sising binaries such as victim/off ender, powerful/powerless, 
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expert/layperson. Together these promote a diff erent way of 
thinking, a diff erent set of questions and hence a diff erent 
set of answers.
In considering O’Malley’s reasoning as it might be 
applied to Australian refugee policy, it would begin by 
canvassing all identifi able and relevant risks—border and 
national security concerns and risks to the health and 
well-being of asylum seekers—and seek to quantify them. 
Questions framed in terms of risk sidestep value-laden con-
cerns, instead emphasizing preferred outcomes which can 
be agreed by stakeholders and assessed against indicators 
that include, perhaps, human rights instruments as well as 
numbers of unauthorized boat arrivals. Being risk-focused, 
questions would consider damage that might be done to, 
for example, Australia’s standing overseas if seen to be in 
breach of international law as well as those most directly 
aff ected by the policy. Th is approach would look at the 
fi nancial costs of contracting out to service providers such 
as IOM, and fi nancing the building and refurbishment of 
Indonesian immigration detention centres, and weighing 
these against the fi nancial cost of alternative policies. Th ese 
might have a diff erent aim altogether or seek to stop asylum 
seekers getting on smugglers’ boats by providing them with 
an attractive alternative rather than prevention through 
detention.
Adopting a risk-based approach in a comprehensive fash-
ion is, then, more measured and ultimately pragmatic. It has 
the potential to facilitate fi nding a solution to the dilemma 
that confronts those policy makers who may believe that a 
humanitarian/human rights approach to refugees is desir-
able but feel constrained by the politics of the day.
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